Džon Lok i problem eksplanatornog jaza
John Locke and the explanatory gap problem
Апстракт
In this text the author analyzes Locke's epistemological position emphasizing the fact that great British empiricist faced with the explanatory gap problem and despite his own intention resolved it in an extremely strange manner namely he offered two opposite solutions: both reductive and nonreductive one. By means of the explanation of his thesis concerning human mind as 'white paper' and his analysis of so called primary qualities, reductive answer to mind- body problem has been formulated. But in consequence of Locke's introspective method new way of ideas, interpretation of so called secondary qualities and his recognition of an insurmountable epistemic gap between phenomenal qualities of mental states and objects causing them, an opposite solution - nonreductive epistemological argument has been crystallized.
Извор:
Belgrade Philosophical Annual, 2008, 21, 35-43Издавач:
- Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet - Institut za filozofiju, Beograd
Институција/група
Filološki fakultet / Faculty of PhilologyTY - JOUR AU - Draškić-Vićanović, Iva PY - 2008 UR - https://repff.fil.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/411 AB - In this text the author analyzes Locke's epistemological position emphasizing the fact that great British empiricist faced with the explanatory gap problem and despite his own intention resolved it in an extremely strange manner namely he offered two opposite solutions: both reductive and nonreductive one. By means of the explanation of his thesis concerning human mind as 'white paper' and his analysis of so called primary qualities, reductive answer to mind- body problem has been formulated. But in consequence of Locke's introspective method new way of ideas, interpretation of so called secondary qualities and his recognition of an insurmountable epistemic gap between phenomenal qualities of mental states and objects causing them, an opposite solution - nonreductive epistemological argument has been crystallized. PB - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet - Institut za filozofiju, Beograd T2 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual T1 - Džon Lok i problem eksplanatornog jaza T1 - John Locke and the explanatory gap problem EP - 43 IS - 21 SP - 35 UR - conv_587 ER -
@article{ author = "Draškić-Vićanović, Iva", year = "2008", abstract = "In this text the author analyzes Locke's epistemological position emphasizing the fact that great British empiricist faced with the explanatory gap problem and despite his own intention resolved it in an extremely strange manner namely he offered two opposite solutions: both reductive and nonreductive one. By means of the explanation of his thesis concerning human mind as 'white paper' and his analysis of so called primary qualities, reductive answer to mind- body problem has been formulated. But in consequence of Locke's introspective method new way of ideas, interpretation of so called secondary qualities and his recognition of an insurmountable epistemic gap between phenomenal qualities of mental states and objects causing them, an opposite solution - nonreductive epistemological argument has been crystallized.", publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet - Institut za filozofiju, Beograd", journal = "Belgrade Philosophical Annual", title = "Džon Lok i problem eksplanatornog jaza, John Locke and the explanatory gap problem", pages = "43-35", number = "21", url = "conv_587" }
Draškić-Vićanović, I.. (2008). Džon Lok i problem eksplanatornog jaza. in Belgrade Philosophical Annual Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet - Institut za filozofiju, Beograd.(21), 35-43. conv_587
Draškić-Vićanović I. Džon Lok i problem eksplanatornog jaza. in Belgrade Philosophical Annual. 2008;(21):35-43. conv_587 .
Draškić-Vićanović, Iva, "Džon Lok i problem eksplanatornog jaza" in Belgrade Philosophical Annual, no. 21 (2008):35-43, conv_587 .